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This paper examines the relationship between foreign equity participation and
average wages at the plant level. I show that using a binary measure for foreign
ownership, as is the traditional practice in the literature, leads to biased estimates
of the foreign ownership wage premium, compared to the use of a continuous mea-
sure if the true relationship is linear. Using nonparametric and semi-parametric
techniques I nd this is the case: the relationship between the level of foreign
ownership and average wages is better approximated as linear rather than binary.
I nd that a ten percentage point increase in foreign equity participation is asso-
ciated with an approximately 4% increase in the average wage of non-production
workers. These results are the rst to show that the wage premium due to foreign
ownership varies with the level of foreign ownership in a continuous manner.
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11 Introduction
A large body of trade research is devoted to understanding the host-country eects
of foreign direct investment (FDI), which has increased dramatically in recent decades.
One of the key eects studied extensively in this regard is the impact that multinational
activity has on average wages at plants subject to foreign acquisition. It is now well
understood that aliates of multinational companies pay higher wages compared to
their domestic counterparts even after controlling for sectoral, regional, and plant-level
characteristics.1 However, existing studies provide a range of estimates for the average
wage eect of multinational status from 1 percent to 70 percent. Despite the similarity in
the methodology and data sets employed in these studies, it remains to be understood
why we observe such a large range of estimates at seemingly similar multinational
plants and what the precise wage eects of multinational activity are. As Girma and
Gorg (2007) note, even when controlling for observable and time invariant unobservable
characteristics, there remains a fundamental problem in identifying the performance
dierences that is attributable to multinationality per se. The current study identies
the causes of such divergent estimates and documents the causal impact of foreign
ownership on wages using methodology that sidesteps earlier limitations.
Existing studies often estimate a rm-level wage model with a binary variable that
indicates multinational status. Using binary variables in the estimation embodies the
assumption that all multinational aliates are identical with respect to the wages they
pay. Since an indicator variable for ownership status censors the information on what
share of the aliate equity is controlled by the multinational parent, it is unable to
capture any variation in the wages due to dierent levels of foreign equity participation.
If the level of control that multinationals exercise at their aliates aects the wages they
pay, then estimation with a binary variable will fail to capture the heterogeneity in the
wage premium across multinational aliates. Moreover, an econometric issue arises if
the wage premium varies with foreign equity participation. Rigobon and Stoker (2009)
show that the least squares estimator is prone to severe bias when there are several
regressors and a binary variable is used in place of a continuous regressor. Estimates
also become susceptible to the level of thresholds in dening the multinational status
1See, for example, Aitken et al. (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Doms and Jensen (1998), Figini
and Gorg (1999), Taylor and Drield (2005), Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006), Almeida (2007), Heyman
et al. (2007), Girma and Gorg (2007), and Arnold and Javorcik (2009). See Table A1 in Almeida
(2007) for a summary of the literature on the multinational wage premium using rm level data and
the premium estimates.
2of an aliate. Thus, using a censored foreign ownership variable, as is the common
practice in the literature, would lead to inconsistent estimates of the wage premium
when wages vary with the level of foreign equity participation.
This study identies the heterogeneity in the multinational wage premium that arises
due to the level of foreign equity participation using a unique data set from Turkey.
The distinguishing feature of these data is the observation of continuous levels of foreign
ownership at the plant level with a considerable degree of ownership distribution across
the plants. I build on the results by Rigobon and Stoker (2009) to show that using
censored regressors may lead to severe bias not only in ordinary least squares estima-
tion, but also in xed eects estimation. More specically, when the true relationship
between foreign equity participation and average wages is linear, using a binary variable
instead of a continuous regressor leads to inconsistent estimates of the wage premium
even if plant level individual eects are accounted for. By articially creating dierent
thresholds for the foreign ownership variable, I illustrate the \variability" of wage pre-
mia across dierent denitions and the biases that ensue. Up to 14 percent of the wage
premium attributed to a foreign owner may come from dierent levels of foreign equity
participation even after controlling for plant level eects.
Two main results come out of the empirical analysis, which uses the census of
Turkish manufacturing plants over the period 1993-2001.2 First, using nonparametric
and semiparametric regressions, I demonstrate that there is essentially a linear and
increasing relationship between the level of foreign ownership and average wages. This
monotonic relationship holds more strongly for non-production workers than production
workers. Second, I nd that a signicant wage premium exists only for non-production
workers when I produce estimates of the premium that control for plant level eects
and the endogeneity of foreign ownership. I address the endogeneity of multinational
activity by generating instruments from the panel data at hand in a generalized method
of moments framework, which allows me to accommodate a large set of assumptions on
the estimated wage model. My results indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in
foreign equity participation is associated with a 4 percent increase in the average wage
of non-production workers, and that the level of foreign ownership does not aect the
wages of production workers. Therefore, there is a signicant degree of heterogeneity
2Three earlier studies report estimates from matched employer-employee data in addition to rm-
level estimates (see Heyman et al. (2007) for Sweden, and Martins (2004) and Almeida (2007) for
Portugal). These estimates focus on whether foreign rms pay higher wages to identical workers.
While it is desirable to have such data to control for worker heterogeneity, such employer-employee
data do not exist for Turkey.
3in the wage premia at multinational aliates that comes from dierent levels of foreign
equity participation. Moreover, the nding that there is no signicant premium for
production workers is novel in the literature.
Existing literature has identied how the level of foreign ownership is related to
certain aspects of the rm, which may have an impact on average wages. Takii and
Ramstetter (2005) nd that higher foreign equity participation is associated with higher
levels of productivity in Indonesian manufacturing. A similar nding is documented
in the case of Venezuela by Aitken and Harrison (1999). This could arise because a
majority foreign ownership share might be required for bringing in technologies from
the parent rm, which in turn may lead to a high wage premium (Lipsey and Sjoholm,
2006). In a similar vein, Barbosa and Louri (2002) argue that a foreign partner will
demand higher ownership in case of protable aliates and large intangible assets to be
transferred. Indeed, Budd et al. (2005) nd that the degree of multinational ownership
appears to condition the degree of intrarm prot sharing, and that aliate wages are
positively correlated with both parent and aliate prots.
Although some existing studies consider the impact of the level of foreign ownership
on the wage premium, there is no consensus in the literature on the subject. On the
one hand, Martins (2004) nds no higher wage premia for rms that exhibit a stronger
degree of foreign control in Portugal. On the other hand, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006)
and Aitken et al. (1996) nd that majority-owned foreign plants pay higher wages for
skilled workers in Indonesia and Venezuela, respectively. However, these studies do not
address the endogeneity of foreign ownership explicitly. Few studies, notably Heyman et
al. (2007), Girma and Gorg (2007), and Arnold and Javorcik (2009), present estimates
of the wage premium that tackle the issue of endogeneity by using matching techniques.
Hence, the current study is the rst in the literature to identify systematic heterogeneity
in the wage premium due to dierent levels of foreign ownership while accounting for
endogeneity explicitly. I nd that foreign equity participation impacts average wages
at every level and my results are not driven by those multinationals achieving majority
control at their aliates.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the em-
pirical strategy of earlier studies and builds on the results from Rigobon and Stoker
(2009) to demonstrate the problems with the use of binary regressors in the panel data
context. Section 3 introduces the data to be used in the analysis. Section 4 presents
my empirical strategy to test the implications of Section 2 and to identify the relation-
ship between the level of foreign ownership and average wages. Section 5 includes my
4empirical results and presents a set of robustness checks. Concluding remarks appear
in Section 6.
2 Censoring the Level of Foreign Ownership
The equity share that a multinational controls at an aliate is often unobserved in
plant-level data. When it is observed, the common practice is to designate a certain
threshold and dene a plant as \foreign-owned" if the multinational's equity participa-
tion exceeds that threshold.3 In this section, I discuss three issues. First, I describe
how the common practice of using dierent thresholds to dene foreign ownership can
hide the heterogeneity in the wage premium. Second, building on Rigobon and Stoker
(2009), I derive the bias in the xed eects estimate of the wage premium that arises
from censoring a continuous regressor in a single variable regression. Lastly, I extend
this result to the multivariate case and discuss how censoring the level of foreign own-
ership disaects the estimation of the wage premium.
Assume that the true empirical model that links wages to foreign ownership at the
plant level is given by:
wi;t = i + m(xi;t) + 

0yi;t + "i;t; i = 1; :::; N; t = 1; :::; T (1)
where wi;t represents the potential wage, xi;t 2 [0; 100] denotes foreign equity par-
ticipation in percentages at plant i at time t, m(:) is a function that relates xi;t to
wages, i is a time-invariant plant eect, yi;t is a vector of plant-level controls, and "i;t
is White noise. If the level of foreign ownership aects wages linearly, then the true
model becomes:
wi;t = i + xi;t + 

0yi;t + "i;t; i = 1; :::; N; t = 1; :::; T (2)
I conrm in the later sections that the estimated relationship between foreign equity
participation and wages is indeed linear for the present study. I am interested in the
wage premium due to the level of multinational activity, which is captured by  in (2).
The inclusion of i in (2) enables the identication of  from within-plant variation in
3In national and international accounting standards, FDI is typically dened as involving an equity
stake of 10 percent or more at the plant level (Razin and Sadka, 2007), although dierent countries
follow dierent recording practices. For instance, Sweden uses the 50% cut-o in dening foreign
ownership (Heyman et al., 2007). While researchers typically use this cut-o to dene majority control,
it has been noted by the nance literature that shareholders can achieve eective control in many cases
by holding a block that is much smaller than 50% of the rm (Razin and Sadka, 2007).
5foreign control, thus sidestepping problems that might arise from selection of high-wage
plants by multinationals.
Earlier studies estimate a wage premium by using a censored version of the foreign
ownership variable mostly because their data prevented them from observing xi;t in its
continuous nature. Specically, they estimate:
wi;t = ai + bFi;t + c
0yi;t + i;t; i = 1; :::; N; t = 1; :::; T (3)
where Fi;t is a binary variable indicating foreign ownership, dened on a threshold, :
Fi;t = 1[xi;t > ] (4)
Implicit in this practice is the assumption that all foreign plants are identical. When
this is not the case, Figure 1 depicts how censoring the level of foreign ownership hides
the heterogeneity in the wage premium and leads to dierent estimates depending on the
threshold.4 In the gure, all domestic rms are assumed to pay the same wage, w1, while
wages are increasing in the level of foreign ownership for multinationals, as depicted
by the function m(x). Assume that we estimate this relationship with an equation
such as (3), and we set  = 0%. The variable of interest, ^ b, will capture an eect
illustrated by l1 in the gure, with every multinational predicted to pay w2. As l1 simply
captures an average eect, it overstates the wage premium for multinationals with less
than 50 percent ownership and understates it for those above this level. If we instead
set  = 50%, then ^ b captures an eect illustrated by l2, at which all multinationals
are predicted to pay w3. In this case, l2 overestimates the wage premium for most
multinationals and provides a higher estimate than l1. Hence, censoring not only hides
the heterogeneity in the wage premium due to the level of foreign ownership, but it also
results in confounded estimates due to lack of knowledge on m(x).5
Rigobon and Stoker (2009) derive the bias from using censored regressors for the
OLS (ordinary least squares) estimator, and I build on their results for the case of 0-1
censoring as in (4). I show here that their results can be readily extended to the FE
(xed eects, or within-group) estimator. In order to motivate the result, I start the
analysis with a single regressor. Let the true model be given by (2), excluding the vector
of controls yi;t. The xed eects transformation eliminates i from (2) and yields a
single variable model in deviations from individual means:
4Figure 1 is hypothetical and intended for demonstrative purposes only.
5Note that if there was no heterogeneity in the wage premium, then ^ b would return the same
estimate independent of the value of  and accurately capture the return to being a multinational.
6wi;t    wi = (xi;t    xi) + ("i;t    "i) (5)
where  wi = T  1 PT
t=1 wi;t, and  xi and  "i are dened similarly. The FE estimator, which









t=1(xi;t    xi)2
I am interested in the asymptotic bias that arises when one estimates the following
model instead:
wi;t = ai + bFi;t + i;t; i = 1; :::; N; t = 1; :::; T (6)









t=1(Fi;t    Fi)2
The bias that I am going to characterize is given by plim^ bFE  , which will clearly
be aected by the threshold . To see this formally, recall that ^ bFE is identical to the




ajdi;j + bFi;t + i;t (7)
where di;j = 1 if i = j and 0 elsewhere. Following Rigobon and Stoker (2009), the
probability limits of the OLS estimators of (7) are given by:6
plim^ ai;FE = E[wi;tjFi;t = 0; i] = i + E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i]
plim^ bFE = E[wi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[aijFi;t = 1; i]
= E[wi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[wijFi;t = 0; i]
= i + E[xi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   i   E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i]
=  fE[xi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i]g
The FE estimator ^ bFE measures  up to a positive scalar as in the OLS case, but
dierently, this scalar is now determined by the expectations conditional on i. The
6The dierence here from Rigobon and Stoker (2009) is the conditional expectations, since the true
data generating process (DGP) is now given by the single variable version of (2) with time-invariant
individual eects instead of a cross-sectional DGP. Remember that the interpretation of  comes from
the conditional expectation on the structural equation (2) even though one uses the censored version
of (5) or (7) in practice to estimate the parameters of the model.
7bias is:
plim^ bFE    =  fE[xi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i]   1g
What does this result tell us? If one is merely interested in whether foreign ownership
causes a positive or negative wage premium, then using a censored regressor will provide
a consistent answer as to the direction of this association. However, if the interest is
in the size of the premium, then ^ bFE provides an estimate that is confounded by the
dierence E[xi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i]. This within dierence depends not
only on , but also on the conditional distribution of the uncensored variable xi;t. For
instance, if foreign owners acquire higher equity stakes at plants that are larger in size
or that operate in certain industries, then we would expect the within dierence to be
larger in such plants and industries. Thus, the extent of the heterogeneity in foreign
ownership directly impacts the wage premium estimate and 0-1 censoring might lead
to misestimates by hiding this information.
In practice, one is typically interested in the parameters of a multivariate model,
which calls into question the transmission of bias among the regressors. Assume that
the true model is given by (2) in which the vector yi;t consists of a single control yi;t.
The censored model is:
wi;t = ai + bFi;t + cyi;t + i;t; i = 1; :::; N; t = 1; :::; T (8)
The FE estimator of b is again identical to the estimator obtained by OLS estimation




ajdi;j + bFi;t + cyi;t + i;t (9)
Following Rigobon and Stoker (2009), denote the residual of wi;t regressed on Fi;t as:


















Fi;t). Applying the same transformation to both sides of (2), one gets:
wi;t = xi;t + 
yi;t + "i;t (10)
If one applies this transformation to the model in (9), both the censored variable
Fi;t and the individual dummies di;j are removed, which yields the estimation equation:
wi;t = cyi;t + vi;t (11)
Rigobon and Stoker (2009) note that the bias in ^ c of (8) is the same as that of (11),
8which arises due to the omission of xi;t from (10). The standard omitted variable bias
formula then yields plim^ cFE = 





(1   p)Cov(yi;t; xi;tjFi;t = 1; 
i) + pCov(yi;t; xi;tjFi;t = 0; 
i)
(1   p)V ar(yi;tjFi;t = 1; 
i) + pV ar(yi;tjFi;t = 0; 
i)
and p is the probability that Fi;t = 1. Again, the dierence in the current result from
that of Rigobon and Stoker (2009) for the OLS case is that the covariances and variances
are now conditioned on individual eects, 
i, where the linear projection of xi;t on the
additional regressor is expressed as: xi;t = 
i + yi;t + ri;t.
Hence, the parameter , which measures how within-deviations of foreign equity
participation are proxied by the within-deviations of the additional regressor, deter-
mines the size of the bias in ^ c. As Rigobon and Stoker (2009) note, it is impossible to
assess the bias in terms of size and direction if one has no information regarding the
within-variation of xi;t. The probability limits for the other coecients in (8) are given
by:
plim^ ai;FE = E[wi;tjFi;t = 0; i]   cE[yi;tjFi;t = 0; i]
= i + E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i] + (
   c)E[yi;tjFi;t = 0; i]
= i +  [E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i]   E[yi;tjFi;t = 0; i]]
plim^ bFE = E[wi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[wi;tjFi;t = 0; i] + cE[yi;tjFi;t = 0; i]   cE[yi;tjFi;t = 1; i]
= i + E[xi;tjFi;t = 1; i] + 
E[yi;tjFi;t = 1; i]
 i   E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i]   
E[yi;tjFi;t = 0; i]
 cfE[yi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[yi;tjFi;t = 0; i]g
=  [E[xi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[xi;tjFi;t = 0; i]
  fE[yi;tjFi;t = 1; i]   E[yi;tjFi;t = 0; i]g]
The bias in ^ bFE thus depends on two extra terms compared to the single regressor
case: how the additional regressor covaries with x, and the distribution of the additional
regressor conditional on censoring and i. With additional regressors in the picture, it
is possible to have a case where ^ bFE may actually have the wrong sign.7 Hence, with 0-1
censoring, it is possible to end up not only with a biased estimate of the wage premium,
but also with the wrong sign on it.
7 This will be the case whenever we have:
E[xi; tjFi;t=1;i] E[xi; tjFi; t=0;i]
E[yi; tjFi; t=1;i] E[yi; tjFi; t=0;i] < .
93 Panel Data on Turkish Manufacturing
Data on the Turkish manufacturing industry come from the Industrial Analysis Database
by the Turkish Statistical Oce (TurkStat), which covers all manufacturing plants in
Turkey with more than ten employees, including plants controlled by foreign investors.
For this study, I focus on the period 1993-2001. The inclusion of plant identication
codes enables me to construct a panel and follow the plants over time. The total number
of manufacturing plants varied between 10,567 in 1993 and 11,311 in 2001 (see Table
A2). The percentage of foreign plants in the sample, dened as plants that have at
least some level of foreign ownership, increased from 2.85 percent to 3.88 percent over
the same period. The measure of foreign ownership in this study is the percentage
of subscribed equity owned by the foreign investor, which varies between 0 and 100
percent. The average foreign equity participation at plants owned partially or fully by
foreigners increased from 58.78 percent in 1993 to 64.33 percent in 2001.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of foreign ownership shares for all plant-year ob-
servations for the subset of foreign plants in the sample. There is a substantial degree
of heterogeneity in how much control multinational rms exercise. While most foreign
plants seem to be majority owned, there is a signicant number of plant-year observa-
tions with multinationals owning less than 50 percent of the plant's equity. Moreover,
one sees the full range of ownership shares with sizable densities in each bin of the
distribution. Similar patterns can be seen when I reproduce Figure 2 for dierent in-
dustries or plant sizes (results not reported here). Informed by the analytical results
in the previous section, I expect this pattern in the level of foreign ownership to bias
estimates of the wage premium in a censored regression.
In addition to foreign ownership, the database contains yearly information on em-
ployment, inputs, output, value added, wages and compensation, sales, inventories,
additions to xed assets, energy use, sector, and location. Plant size is measured as
the total number of paid workers at a plant in any given year. I observe the number
of production and non-production workers and total payments to each group in the
database. In all of the analyses, total yearly wages as reported by the plants are used
in the calculation of the average plant wage and the average wage for production and
non-production workers, excluding any additional benets and compensation.8
8Number of paid workers are reported for production and non-production workers four times during
a given year (in February, May, August, and November) and the average of these four observations
constitutes the average number of workers at the plant in a given year (i.e. the plant size).
10A frequently mentioned source of possible selection bias is acquisitions of high-wage
domestic plants by multinational rms, also known as cherry picking (see Lipsey and
Sjoholm (2006) and Almeida (2007)). It could be the case that foreign plants acquire
domestic establishments that are already highly productive and large in size and that
therefore pay higher wages in general. Such selection bias would distort the results of
the empirical investigation if plant eects are not controlled for. Figure 3 provides the
average yearly wage for plants which experienced a takeover in the sample period by
type of ownership and compares these values to the average wage in the overall sample.
Figure 3 reveals that plants which experienced a takeover during the period 1993-
2001 were paying much higher wages to their workers compared to the plants in the
overall sample. This holds for such plants regardless of whether they were under foreign
or domestic ownership, which provides evidence to the oft-mentioned selection bias of
high-wage plants by foreigners. In this case, least squares estimates will tend to capture
the dierence in levels between the traditionally high wage rms, which are most likely
to be acquired, and the traditionally low wage rms that will almost always stay under
domestic control. However, one can also see from Figure 3 that wages were higher
at plants that experienced a takeover when they were under foreign ownership. This
suggests that foreign ownership per se might have an impact on the average wage, even
though the estimated premium after controlling for the individual rm eect is likely
to be much smaller than least squares estimates.
4 Empirical Methodology
Two empirical ndings characterize the activity of multinationals in Turkey with respect
to the level of control they exercise and the plants they acquire. First, foreign investors
choose to own any percentage of subscribed capital (equity) when they engage in FDI,
allowing them to exercise various degrees of control at the acquired plant. Second,
regardless of the equity share they eventually own, they target domestic plants which
already pay wages that are much higher than the average. In this section, I outline a
three-step empirical strategy to analyze the link between foreign ownership and wages
in light of these two regularities. I rst describe how the predictions of Section 2
on censoring are tested and then turn to provide estimates of the foreign ownership
premium that control for plant-level eects and endogeneity.
114.1 Dening Dierent Thresholds
Observing foreign equity participation at the plant level allows me to dene multina-
tional status using dierent thresholds. In order to analyze how these dierent thresh-
olds aect the wage premium, I estimate the following censored equation:
lnwijt = 0 + 1FDIPlantijt + 
0Xijt + Sector + Region + Time + "ijt (12)
where FDIPlantijt = 1[xijt > ] indicates multinational status, xijt is foreign equity
participation and varies between 0 and 100 percent,  is the threshold level, and i, j,
and t index plant, sector, and year, respectively. In equation (12), wijt is the average
yearly plant wage and Xijt is a vector of plant-specic characteristics such as size
and skill intensity. Sector dummy variables at the two digit level of the ISIC Rev.
2, regional dummy variables, which classify each plant belonging to one of the seven
geographical regions in Turkey, and time dummy variables control for sector, region and
year specic wage eects, and "ijt is a random plant-specic error component. In all
my specications, I estimate the equation of interest for three dependent variables: the
average plant wage, the average wage for production workers, and the average wage for
non-production workers.
I estimate equation (12) by OLS and FE using four possible values of  that are
arbitrarily chosen: 0%, 15%, 30%, and 50%. The goal of this exercise is to demon-
strate the bias in OLS and FE estimations that arises from using dierent thresholds
in the denition of a multinational plant. Varying estimates of 1 due to the threshold
level  would indicate that the multinational wage premium depends on this arbitrary
denition of multinational status. In light of the analytical results in section 2, this
would suggest that the level of foreign equity participation is innately tied to average
wages. If this were not so, i.e. the level of foreign equity participation does not aect
average wages, then we would see identical estimates and statistical (in)signicance of
1 regardless of the threshold level. This counterfactual case would correspond to the
absence of heterogeneity in the foreign ownership wage premium.
4.2 Nonparametric and Semiparametric Analysis
In my second round of estimations, I examine whether the true relationship between
foreign equity participation and wages is linear. I rst estimate this relationship non-
parametrically using the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (Lowess) estimator of
12Cleveland (1979). Consider a regression of wages on foreign equity share, given by the
model:
wi = m(xi) + "i; i = 1;:::;N (13)
where the error term "i is i.i.d. Lowess is a standard local regression estimator, whereby
one lets m(xi) be linear in the neighborhood of a data point x so that m(xi) = m +
(xi   x). Cleveland (1979) suggested that one minimize:
N X
i=1







with respect to m and , where K(:) is a kernel weighting function. This can be achieved
by performing a weighted least squares regression of wi against z0
i = (1;(xi   x)) with
weights K
1=2
i (Pagan and Ullah, 1999). The weighted least squares regression estimates
for each observation i are then used to predict the value of the dependent variable to
trace out the non-parametric relationship between w and x. For implementing Lowess,
I use the tricubic kernel as my weighting function, which places less weight on points
near the end of the sample, and I use a bandwidth of 0.8, which uses eighty percent of
the sample for each regression.9 Despite its computational intensity, Lowess is prefer-
able over kernel regression as it uses a variable bandwidth, robusties against outliers,
and uses a local polynomial estimator to minimize boundary problems (Cameron and
Trivedi, 2005).
I implement Lowess in two dierent ways. The rst set of Lowess regressions is
run on the pooled cross-section sample of plant-year observations using average plant
wage and foreign equity participation. In the second set of Lowess regressions, I include
plant level xed eects to the model in (13). Accordingly, I transform my data into
within-plant deviations before estimating the non-parametric model, which allows me to
control for plant-specic eects. This means that the weighted least squares estimates
are identied from the within-plant variation in each local regression. Hence, I am able
to identify whether changes in the level of ownership at a multinational plant over time
aect the level of wages at the same plant or not.
One can question whether the identied relationship by the nonparametric analysis
is driven by some omitted variables. In order to overcome this concern, I next turn to a
semiparametric analysis where additional controls enter the true model parametrically
9I also experimented with a bandwidth of 0.5 for both my nonparametric and semiparametric
estimates, which left my results unchanged.
13and are additively separable from the nonparametric component. Consider the partially
linear model:
wi = m(xi) + 
0Xi + "i; i = 1;:::;N (15)
where Xi is a vector of plant characteristics. I implement the dierence-based semipara-
metric estimator of Yatchew (1997), whereby m(:) is assumed to have a bounded rst
derivative. Yatchew (1997) suggests ordering the data such that x1 < x2 < ::: < xN
and taking the rst dierence of (15). The transformed equation is then estimable by
ordinary least squares. First-dierencing equation (15) allows inference to be carried on
0 as if there were no nonparametric component in the model. But once 0 is estimated,
a variety of nonparametric techniques could be applied to estimate m(:) as if 0 were
known (Lokshin, 2006), that is, after constructing the dierences wi   ^ 0Xi. In my
estimations, the nonlinear function m(:) is estimated by the Lowess procedure outlined
earlier, using a bandwidth of 0.8. Additionally, a signicance test on xi can be carried
out, which tests the null hypothesis that the regression function has the known para-
metric form g(x; ) + 0Xi, where  is an unknown parameter, against the alternative
semiparametric form m(xi) + 0Xi, where m(:) is unknown. Lokshin (2006) provides
details on the test.
4.3 Estimating the Foreign Equity Participation Premium
If there is evidence that censoring xi returns biased estimates and that the true relation-
ship is linear, then I can expect the regressions with continuous observations to provide
more accurate estimates of the foreign ownership wage premium. In this subsection, I
focus on quantifying the impact of foreign equity participation on average wages. For
this purpose, I estimate the premium by running a set of regressions on the subset of
plants that have been under multinational control at any point in the sample period.
In this framework, I can test whether increases in foreign equity share translate into
higher wages at the plant level.
Two considerations are in place here. First, cherry-picking of high paying domestic
rms by foreign investors and the presence of unobservable rm characteristics require
the inclusion of plant-level eects to the econometric specication. Second, the assump-
tion that foreign equity participation is independent of the idiosyncratic error term can
be easily violated. While it is relatively easy to handle endogeneity that arises from
unobserved heterogeneity, it is much harder to handle dynamic endogeneity whereby
14current and past levels of wages may aect the level of foreign ownership. In addition,
endogeneity bias will arise if the level of foreign ownership responds simultaneously
to idiosyncratic shocks and in the case of measurement error. This naturally calls for
an instrumental variable estimation; yet, it is extremely dicult (if not impossible) to
come up with a valid instrument in such plant level studies.
At this point, I take advantage of the panel data at hand to use exogenous regressors
in other time periods to instrument for endogenous regressors in the current time period.
Consider the dynamic model:
lnwijt = 
lnwij;t 1 + 1FEPijt + 
0Xijt + i + "ijt; t = 2;:::;T (16)
where i denote time independent plant-level eects and we assume foreign equity par-
ticipation, FEPijt, to be endogenous. It is assumed that j
j < 1 and "ijt are serially
uncorrelated. In order to tackle the endogeneity problem, one can rst-dierence the
model in (16) to purge i, which in addition renders lagged values of lnwijt and xijt to
be valid instruments in the transformed equation. Consistent and ecient estimation
can then be achieved by GMM estimators that use all available lags at each period as
instruments for the equations in rst dierences (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Blundell
and Bond (1998) extend the Arellano-Bond estimator to include more instruments that
are available by assuming that rst dierences of instrumenting variables are uncor-
related with the xed eects, which greatly improves eciency and reduces the nite
sample bias. However, the estimator can easily generate a large number of instruments
given the availability of lags and additional moment conditions, which will lead to an
overt of the endogenous variables that tends to distort inference in nite samples.10
In order to guard against problems due to a large number of instruments, I estimate
(16) both using all available lags (and dierences) as instruments and with a restricted
set of instruments (to two most immediate lags).
I implement the\system GMM"estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) in a two-step
procedure and apply the nite-sample correction of Windmeijer (2005) to the standard
errors. Traditionally, researchers using these GMM estimators have focused on results
for the one-step estimator, partly because simulation studies suggested very modest
eciency gains from using the two-step version (Bond, 2002). The two-step estimator
also tends to return standard errors that are severely downward biased when the number
10The problem arises because a high number of instruments means a poorly estimated optimal
weighting matrix in the GMM estimator. See Roodman (2008) for a discussion of how 'instrument
proliferation' can lead to serious problems when implementing these GMM estimators.
15of instruments is large. However, Windmeijer (2005) nds that the two-step ecient
GMM estimator with the corrected variance estimate leads to more accurate inference
compared to the one-step estimator. For this reason, I report estimates of the two-step
procedure with the Windmeijer correction, but I also conducted the estimation with
the one-step estimator as a robustness check. The results for the one-step estimator are
very similar to the results reported here and available upon request in an additional
appendix.
5 Results
5.1 Estimates with Dierent Thresholds
In my rst set of regressions, I estimate equation (12) using a binary variable that
species whether a plant is classied as foreign (i.e. FDIPlant takes on the value of
unity) depending on the level of foreign equity participation.11 Table 1 documents the
dierences in the estimates of the wage premium when various thresholds are used.
The threshold value used to dene FDIPlant is given in rows (a)-(d), while columns
(1)-(3) present OLS estimates and columns (4)-(6) present FE estimates for the three
wage variables of interest. For example, the gure in row (b) and column (1) indicates
that the OLS estimate of the average plant wage premium to multinational status is
51 percent when a plant is dened as foreign if it has at least 15 percent foreign equity
participation. Controlling for plant-level eects, however, reduces the estimate of the
premium to 11 percent in row (b) and column (4) when the same threshold is applied.12
It is immediate from this discrepancy that foreign investors acquire plants that already
pay high wages, justifying the motivation to focus on a wage model with plant-specic
eects.
11In each regression, I control for a set of plant-level characteristics. These are: log plant size (as
measured by the total number of employees); skill intensity (given by the ratio of skilled workforce to
total plant size); ratio of production workers to total plant size; log value added per worker (data on
value added provided by TurkStat); log electricity used or log inputs; sector, year, and region dummies.
Sector and region dummies are replaced by plant-level eects for FE regressions. I also estimated all
reported specications controlling for log inputs instead of log electricity and my results do not change.
The full set of results for the OLS and FE regressions with various thresholds, including the estimates
for the controls and regression diagnostics, can be found in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix.
12If foreign investors acquire plants which already pay higher wages than the rest of the domestic
plants, then we should expect to see a modest wage premium to becoming multinational. This result is
consistent with the results by Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006), Almeida (2007), and Heyman et al. (2007),
who nd a lower premium when they control for plant level eects. Almeida (2007) shows that foreign
acquisitions have small eects, typically less than 2%, on average wages at the acquired rms when
\cherry-picking" is taken into account.
16Estimates from Table 1 indicate that the wage premium typically increases as the
threshold level  gets higher. This holds true of all the OLS estimates, for which
the discrepancies between the estimated premia are greater across various thresholds.
The average plant wage premium is estimated to be 48 percent (row (a), column (1))
when there are no thresholds, while it is estimated to be 57 percent (row (d), column
(1)) when  = 50%. This implies that 9 percent of the average plant wage premium
is purely attributable to using dierent thresholds. When I repeat the same exercise
for production and non-production workers, I see similar discrepancies between the
estimated premia. The estimated premium ranges from 17 to 22 percent for production
workers (column (2)) and from 37 to 45 percent for non-production workers (column
(3)), suggesting a greater degree of heterogeneity in the premium for the latter group
of workers.
The problems with inference on a censored variable become more apparent in the FE
estimates of Table 1, columns (4)-(6). While the discrepancies between the premium
estimates for dierent thresholds are smaller, column (5) shows that the statistical
signicance of the estimate can be aected by the threshold value. In column (5),
the wage premium to production workers is consistently positive, yet it is signicant
only when  = 15% (row (b)). Moreover, while the OLS estimates demonstrate a
higher premium when the threshold increases, the FE estimates in columns (5) and (6)
do not display such monotonicity. Similar to OLS results, however, there is greater
heterogeneity in the wage premium of non-production workers even after controlling
for plant level eects. Column (6) indicates that the premium estimate for this group
ranges from 18 to 25 percent. Hence, Table 1 shows that using dierent thresholds
yields inconclusive evidence on whether there really exists a wage premium at foreign
plants for all groups of workers, and even if so, how large this premium is.
As a further test of how dierent denitions of a foreign plant aect average plant
wages, I divide the sample of plants in the data into four categories depending on the
percentage of equity owned by the foreign investor. I assign a value of one to a plant
that has foreign equity participation from the range of intervals that I specify and run
a regression where I include these intervals simultaneously as independent variables.13
The heterogeneity in the wage premium due to the level of foreign control is more
pronounced in this set of regressions, reported in Table 2. Column (1) indicates that the
average wage premium at a plant with at least 50 percent foreign equity participation
13The intervals are 0-15%, 16-30%, 31-50%, and 51-100%.
17is 58 percent, while it is 42 percent for a plant with foreign equity participation in
the interval 31-50 percent, and 32 percent for a plant in the 15-30 percent interval.
Controlling for plant-level eects, the estimated wage premia are 15 percent for plants
with at least 50 percent foreign equity, and around 8 percent for other foreign plants
(column (4)), which suggests that obtaining majority control creates an impact.
However, when I run the same regression for production and non-production workers
separately, I see that the eect of equity participation can be nonmonotonic. In col-
umn (6), the estimated wage premia for non-production workers for the intervals 15-30
percent, 31-50 percent, and 51-100 percent are, 20 percent, 14 percent, and 28 percent,
respectively. Hence, even after controlling for plant-level eects, up to 14 percent of the
estimated wage premium can be explained by dierent levels of foreign equity partic-
ipation. Consistent with earlier ndings, column (5) shows that whether or not there
is a wage premium for production workers is aected by the denition of multinational
status. I nd that there exists a premium (around 7 percent) for this group of workers
only at plants that have at least 50 percent foreign equity participation.
These results indicate that the methodology followed in classifying a plant as foreign
may signicantly impact the estimated eect of foreign ownership on average wages.
Censoring the foreign ownership variable in an arbitrary way hides the heterogeneity
in the wage premium due to the level of foreign equity participation. Moreover, this
heterogeneity may exist only for a certain group of workers, and such information will
be lost when econometric analysis is carried out with binary data.
5.2 Nonparametric and Semiparametric Estimates
The results from the previous section suggest a monotonic and positive relationship
between foreign equity participation and average wages, however there is also some
evidence indicating nonlinearities. In order to see the true shape of the relationship,
Lowess plots of equation (13) are presented in Figures 4 and 5, which use the subset
of plants that have been under foreign ownership at some point in the sample period.
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between foreign equity participation at the plant level
versus (log) average wages in the pooled sample. Panel (a), which shows the relationship
for the average plant wage, indicates an upward sloping Lowess plot line that is almost
exactly the same as the linear t. In panels (b) and (c), a similar relationship is
observed for the (log) average wage of production workers and non-production workers,
respectively. In all of the panels, the nonparametric t displays an upward trend. One
18can also see from panels (b) and (c) that there is a larger dispersion of wages at all
levels of foreign equity participation for non-production workers compared to production
workers.
If foreign investors acquire higher fractions of equity at domestic plants that pay
higher wages to start with, then this sort of a selection mechanism could drive the
relationship in Figure 4. To guard against such selection, Figure 5 presents the Lowess
estimates that control for plant level eects. I plot average wages against the deviations
from the within-plant mean value of foreign equity participation.14 Panel (a) shows that
higher levels of foreign equity participation are associated with higher average plant
wages, even when the multinational status of a plant is unchanged. This means that it
is not simply being foreign that brings a premium with it, but also that the size of this
premium increases with the level of foreign equity paticipation. Similar to the nding
in Figure 4, the Lowess estimates with xed eects are roughly in line with the linear
t. Panels (b) and (c) show that the monotonic and positive relationship holds likewise
for average production and non-production worker wages.
It is possible that the observed relationship between average wages and foreign eq-
uity participation is driven by some omitted factors. For instance, Aitken and Harrison
(1999) nd that foreign equity participation is positively correlated with plant produc-
tivity as measured by (log) output. If foreign plants pay their workers competitively,
then this positive correlation should also be re
ected in average wages. Figure 6 shows
the Lowess estimates of m(xi) in equation (15) using the dierence based semiparamet-
ric estimator of Yatchew (1997), which control for additional plant characteristics such
as (log) value added per worker. The coecient estimates from the dierence-based
semiparametric regression of (15) for the three dierent groups of workers are reported
in Table A5 in the Appendix, along with the signicance test of the nonparametric
variable under the V-stat.
Panels (a) and (c) of Figure 6 conrm the earlier ndings that average plant wages
and average wages for non-production workers increase monotonically with foreign eq-
uity participation. The signicance tests reported in Table A5 indicate that foreign
equity participation is highly signicant for average plant and average non-production
14Notice that most of the deviations from within-plant mean equity participation are positive and
away from zero. This means that not only do levels of foreign ownership change at a plant over
the sample period, but also that most of these changes constitute increases in the foreign ownership
level. This highlights the importance of using uncensored versions of the foreign ownership variable,
as the information from changes to the level of foreign ownership within the rm is lost when censored
variables are used.
19worker wages, with both tests delivering a p-value of zero (V-stats are 21.064 and 9.402,
respectively). While the signicance test for average production worker wages also re-
turns a p-value of zero (V-stat is 5.850), panel (b) of Figure 6 casts doubt on a linear
relationship for this group of workers. The estimated Lowess plot line in panel (b) is
fairly 
at and shows only a slight upward trend at the high end of the foreign owner-
ship distribution. Compared to the nonparametric estimates of Figures 4 and 5, this
implies that any linear relationship between wages of production workers and the level
of foreign ownership is driven by other plant characteristics, such as productivity or
skill composition. These results suggest that the level of foreign ownership signicantly
impacts the wage premium for non-production workers but it has minimal impact for
production workers. Accordingly, the monotonic relationship between average plant
wages and level of foreign ownership is likely to be driven by the wage premium for
non-production workers only.
5.3 Estimates with Uncensored Regressors
My earlier results suggest that the size of the wage premium is aected by the level of
foreign ownership. This subsection presents accurate estimates of the wage premium
from the model in (16) with uncensored regressors, which not only controls for plant
level eects, but also accommodates the endogeneity of foreign ownership and control
variables.
My preferred set of results from system GMM estimation are reported in Table 3,
where I treat all right hand side variables as potentially endogenous. This specication
generates GMM style instruments for all right hand side variables, which results in
close to two hundred instruments in some cases. While a larger number of instruments
tends to increase eciency, using deeper lags as instruments may weaken the strength
of the instruments. In addition, instrument proliferation undermines the Hansen test,
which is typically used to check instrument validity. Estimates using all available lags
for the instrument set are given in columns (1), (3), and (5), while estimates using the
restricted subset of instruments to the two most immediate lags are given in columns
(2), (4), and (6).15
15Consistent estimation of equation (16) relies on the assumption that the idiosyncratic errors are
serially uncorrelated. Test statistics for this assumption are given in Table 3 as m1, m2, and m3 in
terms of their p-values, which are tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to detect rst-order,
second-order, and third-order serial correlation in the dierenced equation. Since the Arellano-Bond
test statistics in Table 3 reveal second-order serial correlation, I restrict the instrument set to lags
three and deeper.
20The main result that comes out of Table 3 is that there exists a positive and sig-
nicant relationship between foreign equity participation and average wages only for
non-production workers. Column (5) indicates that a 10 percent increase in foreign
equity participation leads to a 4 percent increase in the average non-production worker
wage. Restricting the instrument set to lags three and four in column (6) yields an
estimate of 5 percent. In the case where a plant goes from domestic ownership to being
completely foreign owned (i.e. FEP goes from 0 to 100 percent), columns (5) and (6)
predict the wage premium for non-production workers to be between 39 and 54 percent.
Once we take into account the endogeneity of the foreign ownership variable, there is
no longer an average plant wage premium due to the level of foreign ownership. This
result contrasts with the FE estimates from Tables 1 and 2, which return a positive and
signicant foreign ownership premium for the average plant wage. Hence, simply con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity at the plant level and failing to take into account
other sources of endogeneity may generate considerably dierent results.16
My estimates reported in Table 3 conrm earlier ndings that non-production work-
ers are the primary beneciaries of foreign ownership. Unlike previous studies, however,
I do not nd a signicant wage premium for production workers, as seen from columns
(3) and (4). In addition, my estimates for the hypothetical case for a plant being
completely foreign owned yield larger estimates compared to earlier ndings and they
provide an upper bound on the estimated premium. This is due to the continuous
nature of my foreign investment variable. For example, column (5) suggests that a
domestic plant at which a foreign investor owns 20 percent of the equity will see the av-
erage non-production worker wage to be only 8 percent higher. However, if the foreign
investor owns 80 percent of the equity, then the estimated wage premium is 32 percent.
While the plant would be classied as multinational under both cases, there is a signif-
icant dierence between the wage premia depending on how much of the plant equity
is foreign owned. As can be seen from Figure 1, most foreign plants in Turkey have a
partial degree of foreign control; the wage premia across these plants will therefore be
uneven. As a result, previous studies most likely capture some estimate that lies in the
range reported here and thus hide the heterogeneity in the wage premium that arises
due to dierent levels of control.
The coecient estimates for the controls in Table 3 are as expected, except for
16Note that the point I make here is not due to censoring, but due to endogeneity only. A xed eects
regression with the uncensored foreign ownership variable, not reported here, returns a signicant
estimate, while controlling for endogeneity via system GMM removes this signicance.
21(log) plant size, which seem susceptible to the specication of the instrument set. The
composition of the instrument set also aects the test statistics I use to check instrument
validity. The Hansen test statistics in Table 3 cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the set of GMM instruments used in estimation is valid, although a large number of
instruments tends to reduce the power of this test. I therefore report additionally
the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test
statistics for serial correlation. Both of these additional tests suggest that the sets of
instruments used in the regressions are valid, although the Sargan test rejects their
validity in columns (4) and (6) at the one percent condence level.17
Higher levels of foreign ownership may lead to higher wage premia if plants with
majority foreign control are inherently dierent than plants with minority control. This
could arise, for instance, if a majority foreign equity participation is required for bringing
in technologies from the parent rm (Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2006). In addition, Arnold
and Javorcik (2009) suggest that foreign owners may substitute expatriate sta for local
managers and introduce pay scales linked to performance. Gaining majority control at
a plant is likely to lead to such reshuing of the plant's labor force, especially at
the administrative level, and possibly more on the job training. In order to test for
such \sheepskin eects," I estimate equation (16) with an additional control, which is
a dummy variable indicating majority ownership. The results from this exercise are
reported in Table 4, where all right hand side variables are assumed to be endogenous.
The main result that there exists a signicant wage premium only for non-production
workers is conrmed by Table 4. Having majority control is far from being statistically
signicant in all my regressions. Column (5) indicates that conditional on having ma-
jority control, a 10 percent increase in foreign equity participation is associated with a 7
percent increase in the average wage of a non-production worker. A plant that is com-
pletely owned by foreign investors is predicted to have a wage premium of 39 percent,
which matches the estimate from the same column of Table 3. Column (6) in Table 4
predicts the same wage premium to be 53 percent. The test statistics for instrument
validity cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments at the ve percent
condence level, except for the Sargan statistic in columns (4) and (6). These results
17Roodman (2006) argues that the Sargan and Hansen tests should not be relied upon too faithfully
as they are prone to weakness. While the Sargan test is not vulnerable to instrument proliferation
as the Hansen test, it requires homoskedastic errors for consistency, which is rarely the case in plant
level studies. Arellano and Bond (1991) also report greater power for their own proposed tests in
identifying whether serial correlation renders lagged instruments invalid when compared to the Sargan
and Hansen tests.
22show that the positive relationship between average wages of non-production workers
and the level of foreign ownership is not driven by plants under majority foreign control.
Tables 3 and 4 document that average wages of production workers are unaected
by the level of foreign control. In order to check whether such a relationship is truly
nonexistent, I estimate the model in (16) with a dierent dependent variable. Instead of
using the average yearly wage, I use the average hourly wage for production workers to
calculate the wage premium. Using hourly wage data has the advantage of controlling
for overtime work and can better capture the competitive wage.18 Additionally, one
reason I don't nd a signicant wage premium for production workers might be if foreign
plants employ a greater fraction of their production workers on temporary contracts.
Table A6 in the Appendix shows the results of this exercise.19 Consistent with my
earlier estimates, I nd no signicant premium for production workers in all of the
specications. However, I should note that both Sargan and Hansen test statistics
strongly reject the validity of the instruments, which casts doubt on the reliability of
these estimates.
The ndings that only non-production workers benet from multinational activity
and that the wage premium depends on the level of foreign ownership can help iden-
tify which of the channels previously mentioned in the literature are at work. Arnold
and Javorcik (2009) argue that while foreign owners do not alter the skill composition
of labor at acquired plants, they are able to attract more experienced and motivated
workers. My results suggest that multinationals attract such workers only for white
collar jobs and that higher foreign equity participation is likely to reshue the labor
force engaged in administrative work. Moreover, I interpret my ndings as providing
evidence for prot-sharing arguments at multinational plants. According to this branch
of the literature, multinationals can aord to pay higher wages to its workers if foreign
ownership is associated with higher productivity and protability.20 Aitken and Har-
rison (1999) and Takii and Ramstetter (2005) provide some evidence for the positive
relationship between foreign equity participation and productivity, which seems to be
the driver behind the wage premia observed at multinational plants. However, my re-
18One reason we are observing higher wages at foreign plants might be that workers at foreign plants
might be working longer hours on a given workday or might be taking leave on a less frequent basis
than their counterparts at domestic plants.
19The dynamic specication for this wage series seems to be clear of rst-order serial correlation as
suggested by the Arellano-Bond test statistic m2. Therefore, I also present results from regressions
that use second lags and deeper as their set of instruments.
20See, for instance, Egger and Kreickemeier (2010).
23sults suggest that prot sharing within a multinational is limited to non-production
workers.
Although some existing studies consider the impact of the level of foreign ownership
on the wage premium, they do not nd conclusive evidence. Using panel data from
Indonesian manufacturing, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006) nd that while both majority-
and minority-owned foreign plants pay higher wages than domestic plants, majority-
owned plants pay higher wages for white-collar workers but lower wages for blue-collar
workers. However, the authors argue that none of the dierences between the foreign
majority and minority wages are signicant at the 5% level. A similar result is reported
by Aitken et al. (1996), who nd, using data from Venezuela, that skilled workers receive
around 4 percent higher wages at majority-owned plants compared to minority-owned
plants. Hence, the current study is the rst in the literature to identify systematic
heterogeneity in the wage premium due to dierent levels of foreign ownership.
Robustness Checks
System GMM estimates are usually sensitive to the assumptions made about the vari-
ables of interest and other controls with regard to their exogeneity. These assumptions
determine how the right hand side variables enter the instrument matrix in the con-
struction of the GMM estimator and thus directly aect the number of instruments
created. I previously assumed that the control variables in (16), such as skill intensity
and (log) value added per worker, are potentially endogenous. This results in a large
number of instruments, which can lead to an overtting of the variables of interest.
In my rst round of robustness checks, I therefore provide estimates for the model
where additional controls are treated as exogenous, which greatly reduces the number
of instruments used in estimation.21 The results from the baseline model in (16) with
exogenous controls are reported in Table 5. Note that foreign equity participation is
still assumed to be endogenous.
Table 5 conrms the main ndings from the previous section, but point estimates for
some variables of interest dier from those in Table 3. I again nd that foreign equity
participation signicantly aects the average wages of non-production workers only,
21Strict exogeneity rules out any feedback from current or past shocks to current values of the
variable, which is often not a natural restriction in the context of economic models relating to several
jointly determined outcomes (Bond, 2002). While one can imagine a case where the level of foreign
ownership and the skill intensity of the employees at a plant are determined concurrently, it is not
as straightforward to assume that the former variable will be determined at the same time as, for
instance, plant size or inputs.
24but with a higher premium. Columns (5) and (6) indicate that a 10 percent increase
in foreign ownership leads to an increase in the average non-production worker wage
by 5.4 and 6.9 percent, respectively. The results for the controls are generally similar
to the ones in Table 3, except for plant size. Under the assumption of exogeneity,
plant size is negatively associated with the average plant wage (columns (1) and (2)),
yet it generates a positive and signicant wage premium for non-production workers
(columns (5) and (6)). The Arellano-Bond test statistics conrm the presence of second-
order serial correlation, justifying the use of third lags and deeper for the instrument
set. However, the Sargan and Hansen statistics for overidentifying restrictions point
to weaker instrument validity. This is despite the nding that the coecients for the
lagged wage term in Table 5 are typically high, which corroborates the use of a system
GMM estimator as opposed to the simpler dierence estimator.
I repeat the same robustness exercise, this time including a dummy variable indi-
cating majority control.22 The results, reported in Table 6, conrm my earlier ndings.
Columns (5) and (6) predict that the wage premium at a plant with 100 percent foreign
equity participation is 53 and 66 percent, respectively, which are much higher estimates
compared to the results in Table 4. The Hansen and Sargan test statistics in Table 6
point to weaker instrument validity, although the Arellano-Bond test statistics validate
the use of third lags and deeper. As a result, treating right hand side controls in the
dynamic wage model as exogenous overestimates the wage premium and undermines
instrument validity. This is also suggested by Table A7, which shows the results for the
average hourly wage for production workers when controls are assumed to be exoge-
nous. The estimates for FEP and Log Wage t 1 are highly susceptible to instrument
specication for this wage series, as demonstrated in the results across columns (1)-
(4). Column (2) nds a marginally signicant and positive eect of the level of foreign
ownership on average hourly wages. However, both Sargan and Hansen test statistics
strongly reject the validity of the instruments used in the estimation.
In a second round of robustness checks, I repeat all of the system GMM estima-
tions reported here using a one-step estimator, which is not subject to the critique of
downward biased standard errors in small samples.23 The one-step results conrm my
earlier ndings and provide similar estimates for the wage premium for non-production
workers. The estimated coecients on FEP are almost identical for non-production
workers regardless of whether the instrument set uses all available lags or is restricted
22Dierently from the other controls, however, majority control is assumed to be endogenous.
23These results are available upon request in an additional appendix.
25to the two most recent lags, and they suggest a wage premium of 5 percent for a 10
percent increase in foreign equity participation. Interestingly, the one-step results nd
a negative and signicant estimate for majority control when the indicator variable is
estimated along with the baseline dynamic model.24
6 Conclusion
A large empirical literature has identied a persistent and signicant dierence between
average wages at multinational rms compared to their domestic counterparts. There
exists a wage premium to being multinational even after controlling for selection eects
whereby foreign investors cherry-pick the plants they acquire. At the time of acquisition
or subsequently, the individual characteristics and experiences of foreign investors are
likely to impact the degree of control they want to exercise. The level of control that
foreign owners choose at newly acquired plants may also have dierential eects for
its production and non-production workers. This requires that empirical studies that
explore the relationship between wages and foreign ownership would be better equipped
if they explicitly consider dierent levels of foreign equity participation and account for
the endogeneity of foreign ownership. Most of the previous literature worked with binary
variables to indicate foreign ownership, which might mislead researchers' understanding
of the impact of foreign ownership on wages. Estimation with censored variables on the
right hand side returns biased results even after controlling for individual level eects.
One implication is that one cannot readily compare estimates from country studies with
each other, as the distribution of foreign ownership shares across rms and thresholds
used in the denitions of foreign ownership are likely to vary across countries.
My results provide more accurate estimates for the eect of foreign ownership on
wages by using continuous data for the variable under study at the same time as control-
ling for endogeneity. This allows me to identify the heterogeneity in the wage premium
that arises due to dierent levels of foreign equity participation. I estimate that a 10%
increase in the level of foreign ownership is associated with about a 4% increase in the
average wage of a non-production worker. My results suggest that the identied wage
24As a further test of whether my results are driven by the variation in foreign ownership at a certain
subset of foreign plants, I experimented with system GMM regressions of the dynamic wage model in
(16) using only the subsamples of plants under minority and majority control separately. However,
this exercise runs into the problem of cutting the sample of plants used in estimation by around a half.
As a result, the number of plants (groups) used in the GMM estimation gets closer to the number
of instruments generated, which severely distorts inference. In my estimations on each subsample, I
frequently observe a Hansen test statistic of 1.0, which indicates the severity of this problem.
26premium at multinationals is primarily driven by higher pay for the non-production
workers. I do not nd a wage premium for production workers across a variety of em-
pirical settings. In addition, failing to address the endogeneity of foreign ownership
returns misestimates of the wage premium. A more informed choice of explanatory
variables and econometric specication are thus crucial to better understand both the
impact and the size of the foreign ownership wage premium. The heterogeneity iden-
tied in this paper also raises several issues for further research, especially theoretical
models of foreign direct investment. Why are higher levels of foreign equity participa-
tion associated with higher wages? In addition, why is such a relationship only observed
for non-production workers? Future research that investigates these questions would
be welcome.
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30Figure 1: Censoring the Level of Foreign Ownership
31Figure 2: Distribution of Foreign Ownership Shares at the Plant Level, 1993-2001
32Figure 3: Comparison of Wages Across Plants that Experienced a Takeover
Notes: \Foreign"and\Domestic"refer to plants that were subject to a foreign takeover at one
point in the sample period and depict wages at these plants when they were under foreign
and domestic control, respectively. \Overall" depicts the pattern from the pooled sample of
all plants.
33Figure 4: Nonparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average Yearly
Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Pooled OLS Regression
(a) All Workers
(b) Production Workers
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34Figure 4 (continued): Nonparametric Estimates of the Relationship between
Average Yearly Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Pooled OLS Regression
(c) Non-production Workers
35Figure 5: Nonparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average Yearly
Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Fixed Eects Regression
(a) All Workers
(b) Production Workers
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36Figure 5 (continued): Nonparametric Estimates of the Relationship between
Average Yearly Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Fixed Eects Regression
(c) Non-production Workers
37Figure 6: Semiparametric Estimates of the Relationship between Average Yearly
Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Fixed Eects Regression
(a) All Workers
(b) Production Workers
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38Figure 6 (continued): Semiparametric Estimates of the Relationship between
Average Yearly Wage and Share of Foreign Ownership: Fixed Eects Regression
(c) Non-production Workers
39Table 1: OLS and FE Results: Wages and Multinational Status Dened at Various Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage







































































Notes: This table reports the coecient estimates for the censored foreign ownership variable in the model in (12). The full set
of results for the OLS and FE regressions are in the Appendix, Tables A3 and A4, respectively. All standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity, clustered at the plant level. Coecients are given in the rst line; standard errors in parentheses; *, **,
*** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include (log) plant size, skill intensity, ratio of
production workers, (log) value added per worker, and (log) electricity as controls. OLS regressions include sector, region, and year
dummies, and FE regressions include individual plant eects and year dummies as additional controls.
4
0Table 2: OLS and FE Results: Wages and Multinational Status Dened at Various Intervals
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage


























































































































Model Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9151 0.8956 0.8416 0.8684 0.8847 0.8292
N 91,555 91,392 80,975 91,555 91,392 80,975
Notes: All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, clustered at the plant level. Coecients are given in the rst
line; standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Model eects include
sector, region, and year dummies for the OLS regressions, and individual plant eects and year dummies for the FE regressions.
All regressions include a constant term. Reference category: FDI dummy (interval 0-15%).
4
1Table 3: Two-Step System GMM Results: Wages and Foreign Ownership (Endogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


























































































m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.017 0.018 0.117 0.144 0.015 0.017
m3 (Pr>z) 0.736 0.791 0.219 0.209 0.801 0.902
Sargan 0.036 0.032 0.122 0.001 0.109 0.005
Hansen 0.424 0.610 0.314 0.146 0.141 0.154
Number of Instruments 197 127 197 127 197 127
Instrument Set lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3513 3513 3484 3484 3233 3233
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as endogenous. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer's correction; *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively. m1, m2, and m3 are Arellano-Bond tests for rst-order, second-order, and third-order serial correlation,
asymptotically N(0;1). Sargan and Hansen are tests of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators, asymptotically 2;
p-value is reported. These tests use the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM estimators.
4
2Table 4: Two-Step System GMM Results: Wages and Foreign Majority Ownership (Endogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






































































































m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.017 0.019 0.127 0.170 0.020 0.013
m3 (Pr>z) 0.681 0.789 0.203 0.190 0.746 0.879
Sargan 0.090 0.127 0.065 0.000 0.156 0.006
Hansen 0.384 0.651 0.188 0.094 0.180 0.230
Number of Instruments 224 144 224 144 224 144
Instrument Set lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3513 3513 3484 3484 3233 3233
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as endogenous. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer's correction. See notes to Table 3.
4
3Table 5: Two-Step System GMM Results: Wages and Foreign Ownership (Exogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


























































































m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.040 0.042 0.021 0.021 0.011 0.014
m3 (Pr>z) 0.729 0.765 0.184 0.193 0.883 0.842
Sargan 0.007 0.001 0.089 0.002 0.000 0.000
Hansen 0.070 0.029 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.004
Number of Instruments 67 47 67 47 67 47
Instrument Set lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3513 3513 3484 3484 3233 3233
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as exogenous. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer's correction. See notes to Table 3.
4
4Table 6: Two-Step System GMM Results: Wages and Foreign Majority Ownership (Exogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage
All Workers Production Workers Non-Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






































































































m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.037 0.037 0.039 0.034 0.019 0.014
m3 (Pr>z) 0.691 0.770 0.161 0.165 0.984 0.945
Sargan 0.091 0.025 0.079 0.001 0.002 0.000
Hansen 0.102 0.111 0.004 0.001 0.017 0.021
Number of Instruments 94 64 94 64 94 64
Instrument Set lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3513 3513 3484 3484 3233 3233
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as exogenous. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered at the plant level and adjusted for Windmeijer's correction. See notes to Table 3.
4
5Appendix
Table A1: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Analysis by Type of
Ownership
Foreign Domestic
Foreign Equity Participation N 3140 91434
(%) Mean 60.12 0
Std. Dev. 32.39 0
Average Plant Wage N 3140 91434
(Turkish Liras) Mean 3712.06 1038.28
Std. Dev. 5534.14 1651.31
Average Wage for N 3120 91225
Production Workers Mean 2783.73 972.94
(Turkish Liras) Std. Dev. 4562.69 1550.13
Average Wage for N 3003 79656
Non-Production Workers Mean 5816.05 1487.05
(Turkish Liras) Std. Dev. 9876.44 2807.87
(Log) Plant Size N 3140 91434
Mean 5.01 3.68
Std. Dev. 1.27 1.08
Skill Intensity (%) N 3126 91201
Mean 30.78 19.86
Std. Dev. 21.41 17.12
Ratio of Production Workers N 3140 91434
Mean 0.78 1.54
Std. Dev. 1.58 5.91
(Log) Value Added per Worker N 3102 90049
Mean 8.69 7.24
Std. Dev. 1.76 1.75
(Log) Input N 3140 91414
Mean 13.97 11.62
Std. Dev. 2.34 2.33
Notes: A foreign plant is dened as a manufacturing plant which has any positive ratio of
foreign equity in the plant's ownership. In the sample, the minimum share of foreign ownership
was 1% and the maximum share was 100%.




















1993 301 10,266 10,567 2.85 58.78
1994 312 9,815 10,127 3.08 58.95
1995 325 9,904 10,229 3.18 59.96
1996 326 10,264 10,590 3.08 58.48
1997 362 11,003 11,365 3.19 57.04
1998 416 11,905 12,321 3.38 59.25
1999 406 10,856 11,262 3.61 60.08
2000 414 10,700 11,114 3.73 62.01
2001 439 10,872 11,311 3.88 64.33
Notes: A foreign plant is dened as a manufacturing plant which has any positive ratio of
foreign equity in the plant's ownership. In the sample, the minimum share of foreign ownership
was 1% and the maximum share was 100%. Foreign Presence is the ratio of Number of Foreign
Plants to Total Number of Plants.
47Table A3: OLS Results: Wages and Multinational Status Dened at Various Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage


























































































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.9151 0.9150 0.9149 0.9144 0.8955 0.8955 0.8956 0.8955 0.8415 0.8416 0.8415 0.8412
N 91555 91555 91555 91555 91392 91392 91392 91392 80975 80975 80975 80975
Notes: All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (cluster at plant level). Coecients are given in the rst line;
standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include a
constant term.
4
8Table A4: FE Results: Wages and Multinational Status Dened at Various Thresholds
Dependent Variable: Log Average Yearly Wage

























































































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.8683 0.8681 0.8680 .8677 0.8846 0.8846 0.8845 0.8846 0.8288 0.8289 0.8287 0.8285
N 91,555 91,555 92,887 92,887 91,392 91,392 91,392 91,392 80,975 80,975 80,975 80,975
Notes: All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (cluster at plant level). Coecients are given in the rst line;
standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All regressions include a
constant term.
4
9Table A5: Results from Dierence-Based Semiparametric Regression





















































R2 0.8941 0.8722 0.8431
N 4237 4217 4042
Notes: *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. V-
stat is a signicance test of the nonparametric component in the regression, foreign equity
participation, and is asymptotically N(0; 1). See Yatchew (1997). Both the test statistic and
corresponding p-value are reported.
50Table A6: Two-Step System GMM Results: Hourly Wages and Foreign Ownership
(Endogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Hourly Wage for Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)






























































m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.573 0.353 0.957 0.742
m3 (Pr>z) 0.194 0.216 0.107 0.089
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Number of Instruments 253 148 197 127
Instrument Set lags 2+ lags 2 and 3 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3474 3474 3474 3474
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as
endogenous. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the plant level and adjusted
for Windmeijer's correction. See notes to Table 3.
51Table A7: Two-Step System GMM Results: Hourly Wages and Foreign Ownership
(Exogenous Controls)
Dependent Variable: Log Average Hourly Wage for Production Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)






























































m1 (Pr>z) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 (Pr>z) 0.251 0.128 0.142 0.141
m3 (Pr>z) 0.127 0.127 0.071 0.065
Sargan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Instruments 83 53 67 47
Instrument Set lags 2+ lags 2 and 3 lags 3+ lags 3 and 4
N 3474 3474 3474 3474
Notes: Year dummies and a constant term included in all models. Controls treated as
exogenous. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the plant level and adjusted
for Windmeijer's correction. See notes to Table 3.
52